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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
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Appellees
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District Court
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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellants are holders of Senior Notes issued by Oglebay Norton Company
(“Oglebay”) under a Senior Secured Note Purchase Agreement (“Senior Noteholder
Agreement”).  After Oglebay filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, appellants commenced this
adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court to contest their treatment under Oglebay’s
proposed plan of reorganization.  In addition to Oglebay, appellants named as defendants
     Appellants do not challenge the District Court’s mootness finding with respect to their1
claim for declaratory relief.
4
Wells Fargo Bank (“Wells Fargo”), in its capacity as Indenture Trustee for holders of
certain subordinated notes that Oglebay had issued, and Depository Trust Company
(“DTC”), in its capacity as disbursing agent for property to be distributed to the
subordinated noteholders under the plan.  Appellants sought three forms of relief: (1) a
declaration against all defendants that no distributions could be made to subordinated
noteholders under the plan unless and until Oglebay fulfilled all of its obligations to
appellants; (2) an order requiring Wells Fargo and DTC to turnover any property they
received from Oglebay for the benefit of the subordinated noteholders, to the extent
necessary to satisfy Oglebay’s obligations to appellants; and (3) money damages against
Wells Fargo and DTC in the amount of the value of any property they received from
Oglebay for the benefit of the subordinated noteholders.  
The Bankruptcy Court ruled against appellants on the merits of their claims in both
the adversary and Chapter 11 proceedings, and subsequently confirmed Oglebay’s
proposed plan of reorganization.  Appellants thereafter appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s
final judgment in the adversary proceeding to the District Court, but chose not to appeal
the Confirmation Order entered by the Bankruptcy Court in the Chapter 11 proceeding. 
The District Court dismissed the appeal on constitutional mootness grounds, and this
timely appeal followed.   We will affirm the judgment of the District Court for essentially1
the same reasons set forth in its well-reasoned opinion.
5We agree with the District Court that appellants’ claims for turnover and money
damages against Wells Fargo are moot.  Because Wells Fargo was replaced by DTC in
the chain of property distribution, it never received any property under the Plan for the
benefit of the subordinated noteholders.  We also agree with the District Court that
appellants’ turnover claim against DTC is moot because DTC has, in accordance with the
Plan, already distributed all of the property at issue to the subordinated noteholders. 
Although appellants successfully negotiated with Oglebay to include a “savings clause” 
in the Plan which appellants insist was intended to preserve their right to litigate this
appeal, a jurisdictional defect such as mootness cannot be overcome by agreement of the
parties.  See In re DiGiorgio, 134 F.3d 971, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1998).
Finally, while we would not characterize appellants’ claim for money damages
against DTC as “non-justiciable,” as did the District Court, we agree with its observation
that appellants have failed to state a damage claim against DTC upon which relief can be
granted.  Simply put, appellants have failed to identify the source of the duty DTC is
alleged to have violated.  They insist that DTC had a duty to turn over the property it
received on account of the subordinated noteholders (or pay the equivalent amount in
money damages) to appellants under the Senior Noteholder Agreement.  DTC was not a
party to the Senior Noteholder Agreement, however, and its responsibility under the Plan
was limited to making distribution in accordance with the final, court-approved Plan, a
task which it concededly performed.
6Contrary to appellants’ argument, the savings clause of the Plan did not create or
preserve any liability on the part of DTC.  That clause provided:  “Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in this Section XI.C. [relating to the termination of
certain subordination rights and settlement of related claims and controversies], any and
all rights, arguments and defenses relating to the subordination provisions contained in
the [Indenture] are expressly preserved solely for the holders of [the Senior Notes and a
class of the subordinated noteholders], the Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors, the
Indenture Trustee and the Creditors’ Committee and shall be enforced in accordance with
a Final Order of the Bankruptcy Court resolving the parties’ respective rights under such
subordination provisions.”  App. at 118.  “Final Order” is defined in the Plan as follows: 
 an order or judgment of the Bankruptcy Court, or other court of competent
jurisdiction, as entered on the docket in the Chapter 11 Cases or the docket
of any other court of competent jurisdiction, that has not been reversed,
stayed, modified or amended, and as to which the time to appeal or seek
certiorari or move for a new trial, reargument or rehearing has expired, and
no appeal or petition for certiorari or other proceedings for a new trial,
reargument or rehearing has been timely taken, or as to which any appeal
that has been taken or any petition for certiorari that has been timely filed
has been withdrawn or resolved by the highest court to which the order or
judgment was appealed or from which certiorari was sought or a new trial,
reargument or rehearing shall have been denied or resulted in no
modification of such order.  
App. at 99.
The savings clause envisioned the following chronology of events:  (a) appellants’
subordination rights and arguments would be finally resolved and enforced by court
order; (b) the entry of a final order resolving appellants’ subordination rights and
7arguments would cut off the savings clause; (c) the Plan would be consummated; and (d) 
DTC would receive and distribute property in accordance with the Plan.  Events in fact
unfolded in accordance with this chronology.  Appellants affirmatively chose to raise the
subordination issues in the Chapter 11 proceeding, as well as the adversary proceeding,
and the Bankruptcy Court proceeded to adjudicate the merits of those issues in both
proceedings.  It then issued an order in the Chapter 11 proceeding resolving those issues
and confirming the Plan.  That order became final when the appellants failed to appeal it,
and DTC then, quite properly, distributed the property it received in accordance with the
final, court-approved plan.  Appellants have identified no basis for imposing damage
liability on DTC, and we perceive none.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
